Substitution between fixed-line and mobile access: the role of complementarities by Grzybowski, Lukasz & Verboven, Frank
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
DPS14.12 
 
JUNE 2014 
Substitution between 
fixed-line and mobile 
access: the role of 
complementarities 
 
Lucas GRZYBOWSKI and Frank VERBOVEN 
Econometrics 
Faculty of Economics 
And Business 
Substitution between Fixed-line and Mobile Access: the Role of
Complementarities
Lukasz Grzybowskiy Frank Verbovenz
Abstract
We study substitution from xed-line to mobile voice access, and the role of various com-
plementarities that may inuence this process. We use rich survey data on 160,363 households
from 27 EU countries during 2005-2012. We estimate a discrete choice model where house-
holds may choose one or both technologies, possibly in combination with internet access.
We obtain the following main ndings. First, there is signicant xed-to mobile substitution,
especially in recent years: without mobile telephony, xed-line penetration would have been
14% higher in 2012. But there is substantial heterogeneity across households and EU regions,
with a stronger substitution in Central and Eastern European countries. Second, the decline
in xed telephony has been slowed down because of a signicant complementarity between
xed-line and mobile connections oered by the xed-line incumbent operator. This gives
the incumbent a possibility to maintain to some extent its position in the xed-line market,
and to leverage it into the mobile market. Third, the decline in xed telephony has been
slowed down because of the complementarity with broadband internet: the introduction of
DSL avoided an additional decline in xed-line penetration of almost 9% in 2012. The emer-
gence of xed broadband has thus been the main source through which incumbents maintain
their strong position in the xed-line network.
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1 Introduction
At the start of the 1990s, telecommunications industries in the European Union were controlled
by state monopolies which transmitted phone calls using the xed-line copper network. There
was a small number of mobile phone users via analog networks (1G), which in most of the EU
countries were operated by the subsidiaries of the xed-line incumbents. This situation changed
dramatically during the last two decades. First, in the early 1990s several competing mobile
operators started to deploy voice services based on second generation (2G) technologies GSM-
900 and DCS-1800. Second, after the liberalization in the EU in 1998 a large number of entrants
started providing voice services through the incumbents' xed infrastructure. Third, in the late
1990s the deployment of internet broadband services started, which initially also mainly relied
on xed-line copper networks.
With the deployment of these new technologies the number of communication options in-
creased. This inuenced the way in which people communicate, in particular how they use
copper-based xed-line connections. The rapid increase in the number of mobile users was par-
alleled with a decline in the number of xed-line subscribers. At the same time, the eect of
broadband deployment on the usage of xed-line connections is less obvious. Broadband internet
access was rst deployed using digital subscriber line technology (DSL). This relied on copper-
based networks and required consumers to maintain their xed-line connections. In most of the
EU countries, DSL is still a dominant broadband technology. But there are also countries, es-
pecially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where alternative broadband technologies, such
as cable, bre and mobile broadband, obtained signicant market shares.
In this paper we analyze the substitution between xed-line and mobile voice services, and
the role of several complementarities that may inuence this process. In particular, we ask
whether and how the incumbent xed-line operators managed to slow down xed-to-mobile
substitution, and whether they could leverage their position from xed to the mobile voice
services. Furthermore, we ask to which extent broadband internet slowed down xed-to-mobile
substitution. Addressing these questions is important since xed-to-mobile substitution aects
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the nancial viability of the incumbent xed-line operators. It is therefore critical for both
the operators and industry regulators to understand the interdependencies between dierent
communication technologies. The question of xed-to-mobile substitution is also important
because of the ongoing consolidation process in telecommunications markets. There is a growing
number of mergers between mobile operators which need to be scrutinized by the competition
authorities, and substitution between xed-line and mobile services should play an important
role in the market investigations.
To address these questions, we make use of a unique micro-level dataset of 160,363 households
from 27 EU countries during the period 2005-2011. We adapt the model of Gentzkow (2007) to
analyze the situation in which households may choose bundles of dierent technologies: xed
voice or mobile voice only, or the combination of both services, with or without broadband
internet. We can summarize our results in three main ndings.
Our rst main nding is that households tend to perceive mobile and xed-line connections
as substitutes, and more strongly so in the recent years. In 2006 total xed-line penetration
in the EU was almost 67%, and it would have been 6% points higher if mobile voice had not
been present. In 2012 total xed-line presentation was about 63%, and it would have been
almost 14% points higher without mobile voice access. At the same time, there is substantial
heterogeneity across households and regions. In regions with a higher GDP per capita mobile
and xed-line services tend to be stronger substitutes. After controlling for GDP per capita,
there is also a stronger degree of substitution in the CEE countries, as compared to the WE
countries. There is not only heterogeneity in xed-to-mobile substitution across regions, but
also across households with dierent age, education, professional activity, etc. This implies that
even within a region, some households may perceive xed-line and mobile connections as very
strong substitutes, whereas other households perceive them as essentially independent. Our
nding of strong heterogeneity in the perceived substitutability between xed-line and mobile
voice services provides an explanation for the mixed results found in the previous literature that
uses aggregate data.1
1For instance, Gruber and Verboven (2001) estimate a logistic diusion model for mobile subscriptions in the
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Our second main nding relates to the role of the incumbents, i.e., the previous xed-line
monopolists, in slowing down the extent of xed-to-mobile substitution. To investigate this, we
extended the model based on our data for the years 2006 and 2007. For these years, we observe
whether households have xed and/or mobile voice at the incumbent or at a competitor. This
enables us to consider the simultaneous choice of xed and mobile voice, at the incumbent or a
competitor. We conrm the presence of xed-to-mobile substitution in this model. Furthermore,
we nd that the decline in xed-line penetration has been slowed down because of various
complementarities: bundled contracts and especially incumbency advantages when xed-line
incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantage increased the
incumbent's market share by about 2.5% points in xed telephony and by up to 5% points in
mobile telephony. Incumbents could thus not only slow down the xed-to-mobile substitution
process, but also leverage their strong position in xed telephony into the mobile telephony
market. These complementarities did not hurt, but actually benet total xed and mobile
penetration.
Our third main nding relates to the impact of broadband internet on xed-to-mobile substi-
tution. To assess this, we further extended the model to consider the simultaneous choice of xed
versus mobile voice services and the choice of broadband technology (no broadband, dial-up,
DSL, cable, mobile broadband and other). Also in this model specication we conrm the pres-
ence of signicant xed-to-mobile substitution, especially in the recent years. In addition, we
nd that the introduction of mobile broadband slightly strengthens this substitution. But more
importantly, broadband internet (mainly DSL) has been a strong source of complementarity
with xed-line telephony. Hence, the decline of xed telephony has been slowed down because of
EU and nd that the penetration rate of xed telephony has a negative inuence on the diusion of mobiles.
On the other hand, Gruber (2001) uses a similar approach for the Central and Eastern European countries and
suggests that mobile and xed-line services may be complements. In another paper, Hamilton (2003) uses data
for African countries nds that mobile and xed-line subscriptions may be both complements and substitutes at
dierent stages of market development. In the early stage of diusion, mobile services may complement xed-line
telephones but the substitution eect takes over once mobile usage becomes more widespread.
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the complementarity between the xed network and broadband internet. In particular, without
DSL xed-line voice penetration would have been about 6% lower in 2007, and almost 9% points
lower in 2012. Most of these complementarities arise from bundling xed-line and broadband
in a single contract (enabling price discounts and convenience). These ndings show that the
xed-line incumbent has not only been able to leverage its advantage to mobile voice services,
but more importantly also to broadband.
There is a growing body of literature on substitution between xed-line and mobile services,
as reviewed in the next section. However, none of this work systematically analyzes this sub-
stitution with detailed household-level data to account for heterogeneity in substitution across
households and regions. Furthermore, no work has investigated how complementarities have
slowed down xed-to-mobile substitution, through incumbency advantages and synergies with
xed broadband.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.
Section 3 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 4 introduces the econometric
framework. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a growing body of literature on substitution between xed-line and mobile services,
which was recently reviewed in Vogelsang (2010). Most of these studies use cross-country or
country-level aggregate data and nd substitution between xed-line and mobile telecommuni-
cations services (see Gruber and Verboven (2001), Ward and Zheng (2012), Grzybowski (2013)).
A number of other studies relies on consumer-level data. Rodini et al. (2003) estimate the
substitutability between xed-line and mobile access using data on U.S. households and binary
logit model. They nd that second xed line and mobile services are substitutes for one another.
In another paper, Ward and Woroch (2010) use quarterly survey panel data in the U.S. for years
1999-2001 and a dierence-in-dierence analysis to estimate own- and cross-price elasticities of
demand for xed and mobile services, and they nd moderate substitution between these two.
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Garca-Marinoso and Suarez (2013) use Spanish household panel data for the years 2004-2009
to analyze substitution from xed to mobile services. They nd that apart from household
characteristics also the availability of internet and mobile services plays a role, while prices and
expenditures have no, or a small, impact on the substitution decision.
Among papers which focus on internet access, Cardona et al. (2009) use household survey
data for Austria to estimate discrete choice models and nd that cable modem and mobile
access are close substitutes to DSL and that they are in the same market as DSL. Srinuan et al.
(2012) use discrete choice model on survey data for Sweden and nd that mobile broadband and
xed broadband technologies are close substitutes when they are locally available. Grzybowski
et al (2013) estimate a mixed logit model using survey data for Slovakia and nd that mobile
broadband should be included in the relevant market for internet access based on xed broadband
technologies. However, none of these studies relate internet access to the demand of xed or
mobile connections in voice services.
The studies mentioned above which use discrete choice framework essentially assume some
degree of substitution between telecommunications technologies. There are only two recent
studies, Liu et al. (2010) and Macher et al. (2011), which explicitly model the possibility of
substitution or complementarity between telecommunications technologies in a discrete choice
framework. In the rst paper, Liu et al. (2010) use a panel survey data of U.S. households
for years 2004-2006 to estimate a discrete choice model for broadband services. Their model
allows also for parallel choices of related services such as cable TV and local phone and for
state-dependence in provider choices. They nd evidence of strong complementarities between
the consumption of broadband, cable TV and local phone services, where the main source of
complementarities are the benets derived by consumers from having a single provider for multi-
ple services. In the second paper, Macher et al. (2012) estimate a consumer choice model using
U.S. household data for years 2003-2010 to analyze whether xed-line and mobile connections
are substitutes or complements based on the model developed by Gentzkow (2007). They adapt
the model to a situation in which households choose between having either mobile or xed-line
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access and in addition allow for the use of both technologies at the same time. They nd that
connections to mobile and xed-line telephony are substitutes rather than complements.
Since we also follow Gentzkow (2007), our base model is similar to Macher et al. (2012). But
in addition we also consider heterogeneity in substitution across households and across the many
regions within the set of 27 EU countries. This allow us to conclude whether xed-line and mobile
connections are substitutes, complements or independent from each other in a particular country.
We then comment on the hypothesis that consumers across the EU dier in the perception of
xed-line and mobile services and to what extent this is driven by population characteristics. We
also analyze whether there is any incumbency advantage in oering to consumers both xed-line
and mobile services and to what extent the use of internet technologies inuences substitution
or complementarity between mobile and xed-line connections.
3 Data
Survey data We use ve Special Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 27 EU countries by
the TNS Opinion & Social Network on behalf of the European Commission. The surveys were
conducted in approximately 12 months intervals between December 2005 and December 2012,
with the exception of the years 2008 and 2010.2 The purpose of the surveys is to follow trends
in electronic communications markets and to assess how EU households and citizens derive
benets from increasingly competitive and innovative digital environment.3 A description of the
2There are two 2011 surveys. The rst one was conducted in February-March 2011 and the second one was
conducted in December 2011. The results of the rst survey should not be much dierent if it was conducted
at the end of 2010 instead. We consider therefore that it is equivalent to 2010 survey for consistency with other
surveys which were conducted at the end of each year.
3The surveys used in the analysis are: (i) Eurobarometer 64.4: Mental Well-Being, Telecommunications,
Harmful internet Content, and Farm Animal Welfare, December 2005 - January 2006; (ii) Eurobarometer 66.3:
Social Reality, E-Communications, Commin Agricultural Policy, Discrimination and the Media, and Medical
Research, November - December 2006; (iii) Eurobarometer 68.2: European Union Policy and Decision Making,
Corruption, Civil Justice, E-Communications, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection, November - December
2007; (iv) Eurobarometer 72.5: E-Communications, Agriculture, Geographical and Labor Market Mobility, and
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sampling methodology and summary of the results for questions related to telecommunications
services can be found in the Eurobarometer reports published on the website of the Commission.
The Commission is granting access to Eurobarometer primary data for re-use in social science
research and training. We have processed and combined these ve surveys and selected variables
which are relevant for our questions of interest. Table 1 provides a list of variables which we
use in the estimation. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the number of observations for each
country used in the analysis. Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix illustrate trends in the
data with respect to usage of xed-line and mobile connections.
Prices Data on prices of mobile and xed-line telecommunications services comes from the
reports on \Telecoms Price Developments" produced on annual basis by consultancy rm Teligen
on behalf of the European Commission's Directorate General for Information Society. The
objective of these reports is to analyze price developments in the Member States of the European
Union in years 1998-2010. The reports show prices as of 1st August each year from 1998 to 2004,
as of 1st September from 2005 to 2007, and as of 15th September from 2008 to 2010. Teligen
collected tari data directly from the telecoms operators, from their websites and price-lists.
Taris data were validated by the NRAs to ensure the reliability of information.4 We miss
Eurobarometer data for year 2008 because the survey was not conducted in this year. There is
no pricing data available for 2011, for which we have the last wave of the survey. We therefore
assume that prices were the same in 2010 and 2011.
Prices used in this study are so called \composite baskets", which are constructed by calcu-
Knowledge of Antibiotic Use, November-December 2009; (v) Eurobarometer 75.1: Energy in the European Union,
Citizens' Rights, E-Communications, the Internal Market, and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, February
2011 - March 2011; (vi) Special Eurobarometer 381: E-communications Household Survey, December 2011.
4We have combined Teligen's pricing data with Eurobarometer data. Teligen data for years 2005-2010 was
collected in September, which is a few months earlier than the Eurobarometer data, which was usually collected
at the end of the year. We assume that Eurobarometer data with eldwork in: December 2005 { January 2006
relates to 2005 Teligen data; November-December 2006 relates to 2006; November 2007 { January 2008 relates to
2007; November-December 2009 relates to 2009 and February-March 2011 relates to 2010.
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lating the cost of a xed number of dierent calls per annum, including annual rental charge as
well as installation charge depreciated over ve years. The number and distribution of calls are
kept constant throughout the whole period. For xed-line services, Teligen provides only bas-
kets for the incumbent operator in each country. Mobile baskets are provided for representative
taris from two network operators with the greatest number of subscribers.5 There is no pricing
information available for broadband services. We explain in more detail which prices are used
in the estimation when introducing the models.
4 Econometric Model
We aim to model the households' decisions whether to use xed-line and/or voice mobile tele-
phone services, and in an extension the role played by their internet technology decisions. A
standard discrete choice framework is not suitable for such analysis because households may
simultaneously choose more than one alternative: (i) they may use both xed and mobile voice
services, and (ii) these services can be combined with the use of a certain internet technology. To
incorporate the possibility that households may choose multiple options, we follow the approach
of Gentzkow (2007) and formulate a discrete choice model for bundles of alternatives.
We rst present the base model, where households choose only between voice services (section
4.1), and then extend the model to incorporate the simultaneous choice of internet technology
(section 4.2).
4.1 Demand for voice services
Base model A household i has available two possible voice services, indexed by j: xed-line
(j = F ) and mobile (j = M). The choice set consists of the four possible bundles of these
services, r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg, where r = 0 refers to the choice of no telephone at all, and
r = F +M refers to the choice of both xed and mobile services. Figure 1 shows the shares of
5The denitions of the xed-line and mobile `composite baskets' are explained in detail in Teligen's reports,
which are publicly available on the website of the European Commission.
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these four choice alternatives for each of the 27 EU countries in March 2011. Table 2 summarizes
these shares across all countries, showing that a majority of households in the sample have both
a xed and a mobile voice line, many households either have a xed or a mobile voice line, while
a minority has no voice connection at all.
Household i's stand-alone utility from a connection to voice service j is:
uij = xij + pij ;
where pij is the price paid by individual i for voice service j and xi is a vector of household
characteristics inuencing the utility of the voice service. The price pij refers to the xed sub-
scription charge plus the usage cost of a representative consumer. Here as the price of xed-line
we use a basket for the incumbent's tari and as the price of mobile an average of baskets for
one tari from the incumbent and one tari from the main competitor. The vector of household
characteristics xi consists of three groups of variables: household demographics (such as sex, age,
education, household size); employment status (such as student, retired or employment sector);
and regional and time information (such country, regional GDP per capita, time eects).
A household's utility for a bundle of voice services r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg is:
uir = "ir if r = 0
uir =
X
j2r
uij +  ir + "ir; if r 6= 0 (1)
where j 2 r denotes the set of goods j included in bundle r. The term  ir is the dierence
between the household's total utility for the bundle r and the sum of the stand-alone utilities
uij for the services j 2 r. For the singleton bundles, r = F and r = M , we set  ir = 0. For the
real bundle r = F +M , the services are complements if  ir > 0, they are substitutes if  ir < 0,
and they are independent if  ir = 0. Gentzkow (2007) provides a discussion how price aects the
marginal consumers in these three situations. Macher et al. (2012) adapt the model to the choice
of telecommunications, but in a more restricted setting than ours. We specify  ir = xi, which
allows for household heterogeneity in their valuation of the substitutability or complementarity
of xed and mobile services. The heterogeneity depends on the same household characteristics
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that aect the stand-alone utilities for xed and mobile voice (demographics, employment status
and regional and time information). The terms "ir are i.i.d. type I extreme value, or the typical
\logit" error terms.
Based on this specication, we obtain the following utilities for the four bundles
ui0 = "i0
uiF = xiF + piF + "iF
uiM = xiM + piM + "iM
uiF+M = xi (F + M + ) +  (piF + piM ) + "iF+M :
Note that we only observe prices for the unbundled voice services, piF and piM , and dene the
price of a bundled service as piF+M = piF + piM . If a household adopts both xed and mobile
from a dierent operator, this sum is an accurate description of the cost, as long as usage remains
unchanged.6 If, however, a household has a contract bundle for xed an mobile voice from the
same operator, then the household may pay a lower price because of a discount or receive some
other contractual benets. To account for this \contractual complementarity", we make use of
information in the survey and construct a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has a
contract bundle for xed and mobile voice from the same operator, and 0 if it adopts xed and
mobile voice from a dierent operator. Our estimate of the parameter  may then be viewed
as the extent of substitution/complementarity between xed and mobile net of the contractual
complementarity that arises from the fact that a household makes use of a bundled contract.
Incumbent versus competitor We can easily extend this framework to distinguish between
the type of operator providing the voice service: incumbent or competitor. The index j now
refers to voice service and operator type: incumbent xed-line (j = F1), competitor xed-line
(j = F2), incumbent mobile (j = M1), competitor mobile (j = M2). The choice set then
consists of nine possible bundles r 2 f0; F1; F2;M1;M2; F1 +M1; F1 +M2; F2 +M1; F2 +M2g.
The utilities for the stand-alone alternatives j and for the bundles r take the same form as
6The usage of xed-line and mobile telephones may obviously change when both services are used together.
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before. Since there is a large number of bundles we will impose restrictions on the number of
interaction terms, as explained in the empirical analysis.
The information on the name of operator used by the household is only available for 2005 and
2006, so we limit this analysis to these rst two years of the survey (and we match this with price
information at the level of the operator). Table 3 shows that most households have a xed-line
connection from the incumbent, and among those households there is roughly an equal number
with a mobile connection from the incumbent or from a competitor. The number of households
with a xed-line connection from an entrant is smaller and in some countries xed-line services
are provided just by the incumbent. Also, in three countries, Lithuania, Romania and UK, the
incumbent did not receive a mobile licence at all.
In this model, prices of mobile services are approximated by the usage basket for the tari
from the incumbent and main competitor. But since we only have a basket for the incumbent's
xed-line tari, we assume that incumbent's and competitor's xed-line prices are the same.
4.2 Demand for voice services and internet technology
We now extend the framework to incorporate the households' choice of internet technology. Each
household has available two voice services j = fF;Mg (as in the base model) and six possible
internet technology choices: (i) no internet, (ii) copper-based dial-up, or \narrowband"; (iii)
copper-based DSL broadband; (iv) cable modem broadband; (v) mobile broadband; and (vi)
other broadband (usually bre or WiFi). We denote these internet options by k = 0; 1;    ; 5.
The households' choice set therefore consists of a maximum of 24 possible bundles of services:
the 4 voice bundles f0; F;M;F +Mg times the 6 internet choices. In practice, however, there
are almost no households without a voice service who have an internet connection via any of
the 5 technologies, as shown in Table 4. We therefore restrict the choice set to the remaining
19 alternatives and drop from the analysis the small number of households which selected any
of these 5 alternatives which are not considered as viable in our analysis. Note that in principle
households may choose more than one internet technology. However, as shown in Table 5, the
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incidence of multihoming is rare, and we remove these households from the analysis.
A household's stand-alone utility for voice service j is the same as specied earlier in (1).
The additional utility from combining xed and mobile technology, r = F +M , is also specied
earlier as  ir = xi, where: if  ir > 0 xed and mobile are complements; they are substitutes if
 ir < 0; and they are independent if  ir = 0. The stand-alone utility for an internet technology
k is not identied because in the sample households always combine internet with at least one
voice service. The household's valuation of a specic internet technology k may depend on the
type of voice service j 2 fF;Mg, reecting substitution or complementarity between a particular
voice services and internet. For example, households may keep a copper xed-line connection for
voice because it may also be used to access internet via dial-up or DSL. Conversely, households
may give up their xed-line connection for voice services when they access internet via a cable
modem, a mobile modem or bre.7 To model this, we let ij;k to represent the additional
utility from adopting internet technology k when the household has adopted the voice service
j 2 fF;Mg. We specify ij;k = j;k + xik. The rst term j;k is a xed eect capturing the
valuations for combining the voice service j with the various internet technologies k. The second
term are parameter vectors capturing the eects of household characteristics on the valuation of
internet connection k. For example, iF;1 is the additional utility from adopting copper-based
dial-up (k = 1) when the household has a xed-line. To simplify, assume that k is the same
for all internet connections k > 0 (except for technology-specic intercepts) and denote this by
k = I for k > 0. Hence, I captures households' valuations for any internet connection.
A household's utility for a voice service r 2 f0; F;M;F +Mg in combination with an internet
7Grzybowski (2013) uses the aggregate data from the Eurobarometer reports published by the European
Commission to analyze xed-to-mobile substitution. He reports that the share of `xed + mobile' households
is positively correlated with percentage of households having internet access and negatively correlated with the
share of households having cable modem.
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technology k can then be specied as:
uir;k = "ir;k if r = 0; k = 0
uir;k =
X
j2r
uij +  ir +ij;k + "ir;k if r 6= 0;
where the terms "ir;k are again the logit error terms.
This gives the following utilities
ui0;0 = "i0;0
uiF;k = xi (F + I) + F;k + piF + "iF;k
uiM;k = xi (M + I) + M;k + piM + "iM;k
uiF+M;k = xi (F + M +  + I) + (F;k + M;k) +  (piF + piM ) + "iF+M;k:
4.3 Choice Probabilities and Estimation
In the rst model households choose the voice bundle r and in the second model households
simultaneously choose the voice bundle r and internet technology k that maximizes random
utility. We focus here on the second, more general model. Given that the "ir;k are type I
extreme value distributed, random utility maximization results in the following logit choice
probabilities:
sir;k =
exp (Vir;k)
1 +
P
k
P
r exp (Vir;k)
(2)
where Vir;k  uir;k  "ir;k is the deterministic component of household i's utility for voice bundle
r and internet technology k.
In both the rst model (voice bundles only) and the second model (voice bundles + internet),
we take into account the geographic availability of the choice alternatives. First, while mobile
voice services are universally available in all EU countries, xed voice services may not always be
available in rural areas, especially in the CEE countries. As a sensitivity check, we also estimated
the models on a sub-sample of households living in large towns and cities, where xed-line
connection should be in general available but the results are broadly similar. Hence, we estimate
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the nal model assuming that xed-line is available to all households in each country. Second,
certain types of broadband internet technologies may not be available in certain geographic areas
or even in whole countries. In the second model, we therefore restrict the choice sets to those
broadband technologies that are available in the region where the household lives. If there is at
least one household which uses a particular broadband technology in a given area, we assume
that it is also available to all other households in this area. This assumption still makes the
choice set potentially too broad, because the fact that there are households using a particular
broadband technology in a given geographic area does not imply that it is available to all other
households in this area.
The choice probabilities (with suitably modied summations in the numerator of (2) to
account for limited geographic availability of broadband) form the basis of the likelihood function
that is taken to the data. Dening yir;k = 1 if household i selects voice bundle r and internet
technology k, and yijk = 0 otherwise, the log likelihood function can be written as:
L() =
NX
i
X
r;k
yir;k log sir;k () : (3)
where  is the vector of all parameters to be estimated. The maximum likelihood estimator is
the value of the parameter vector  that maximizes (3). The model allows for rich substitution
patterns because of a large set of included observed household characteristics. We nevertheless
also considered an extension of the model with unobserved household heterogeneity. This in-
volves the typical random coecients of the mixed logit model as in Train (2003), and suitable
restrictions on these random coecients for the bundled alternatives. We found that the stan-
dard deviations of the random coecients were not signicant, so we focus our analysis on the
model with observed household heterogeneity.8
8The mixed logit model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood, and takes considerable time to
converge given the very large number of observations, choice alternatives and included observed household char-
acteristics.
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5 Empirical Results
In section 5.1 we present the empirical results for the two models where households only choose
between voice services (Tables 6 and 8). Section 5.2 then considers the results from the third
model, where households simultaneously choose the voice service and the internet technology, if
any (Table 7). In all specications, we include a rich set of household characteristics. Summary
statistics for these household characteristics were shown earlier in Table 1.
5.1 Voice services
Table 6 shows the empirical results for the two models where households only choose between
the two voice services. The left part considers the base model, where the choice set is limited to 4
alternatives: f0; F;M;F +Mg, i.e. households may either choose no telephone, xed, mobile or
both. The right part considers the second model with an extended choice set of 9 alternatives,
f0; F1; F2;M1;M2; F1 + M1; F1 + M2; F2 + M1; F2 + M2g. As discussed above, in this model
households also decide whether to take xed or mobile services from the incumbent (xed-line)
operator (subscript 1), or from a competitor (subscript 2).
In both specications, price has a negative and highly signicant eect on utility. In addition
to the price parameter, Table 6 reports three columns: the rst and second columns give the
stand-alone utilities for xed-line and mobile voice services (F and M ), and the third column
shows the substitution or complementarity eects between xed and mobile (). Table 6 only
presents the main eects and the interactions with regional variables (regional income per capita
and a dummy variable for the group of CEE countries). Table 8 shows the interactions with the
household characteristics for the rst specication. The estimated household interactions for the
second model (and our subsequent third model with simultaneous choice of broadband) are very
similar, so we only present them in the Appendix.
We focus most of our discussion on the estimated substitution eects (parameter vector ),
but also briey comment on the stand-alone eects (F and M ).
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Base model According to the left part of Table 6, households who live in richer regions are
more likely to have both mobile and xed-line connections (positive and strongly signicant F
and M ). Furthermore, households from the CEE countries are more likely to have mobile,
but less likely to have xed-line connections than households from the WE countries (after
controlling for regional income and other household characteristics). Finally, the adoption of
mobile phones is still increasing over time (during 2006-2011), whereas the adoption of xed-line
services shows limited variation across years.
Our main interest is in the parameter vector , which measures the extent of substitution
(or potentially complementarity) between xed and mobile voice. Notice rst that the intercept
in  is negative and highly signicant. This estimate implies that households on average tend to
view xed-line and mobile voice as substitutes. Furthermore, the extent of substitution became
considerably stronger in the more recent years 2009-2012, compared with the early years of our
study 2006-2008. To assess this further, we computed the average \xed-to-mobile" diversion
ratio implied by our estimates. This ratio is the reduction in xed-line households relative to
the increase in mobile households after a price drop for mobile voice services.9 The average
xed-to-mobile diversion ratio was 9.0% during 2006-2008, and it increased to 15.4% during
2009-2012. This means that, in 2009-2012, a sizeable 15.4% of the (marginal) mobile households
would otherwise have chosen xed-line access.
One can also observe interesting dierences in substitution across regions. There is stronger
substitution in areas with a high regional income per capita and in the CEE countries (negative
and signicant eect in ). The stronger substitution in the CEE countries (after controlling for
regional income and dierences in household characteristics) may be due to the lower quality of
the xed network than in the WE countries.10 Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity
across households in the perceived substitutability between xed-line and mobile services, as
9Formally, this diversion ratio is (@sir;k=@piM ) = (@siM;k=@piM ). We compute this from (2) and the parameter
estimates, and average this over households.
10As mentioned earlier, the model was also estimated for a limited sample of households which live in towns and
cities to account for possible lack of availability of xed-line in rural areas, but the results were broadly similar.
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shown in Table 8. For example, households who live in cities, males and highly educated people
are more likely to substitute to mobile, while large households and households with many kids
are less likely to substitute. Proprietors and travelling professions consider xed-line and mobile
as stronger substitutes, and households with non-working, housekeeping members tend to view
xed-line and mobile as complementary.11
Finally, it is interesting to consider the estimated coecient for the contract bundle variable.
This is signicant and positive, which means that consumers benet from contractual comple-
mentarities when they have a single contract for xed and mobile voice at the same operator.
Such complementarities may be present because of price discounts or because of convenience or
some other contractual advantages. We discuss this further in the next subsection, where we
distinguish between incumbents and competitors.
Incumbent versus competitor The right part of Table 6 shows the empirical results for
the second model with the expanded choice set, which makes a distinction between having a
xed-line or mobile connection from the incumbent or a competitor. This model only uses data
for years 2006 and 2007, because information about the operator used by the households is only
available for these years. The impact of household characteristics is similar to the previous model
(shown in Table 8), so we only present these results in the Appendix. Substitution between xed
and mobile is weaker, which is mainly because we consider only years 2006 and 2007.
Our new ndings relate to the role of the incumbency status. Not surprisingly, households
have a considerably higher valuation for a xed-line connection at the incumbent xed-line
operator (second column). This simply reects the fact that the incumbent operator is the
11Table 8 also shows the eects of household characteristics on the stand-alone utilities for xed-line and mobile
voice services (F and M ). City households have a higher valuation for both xed-line and mobile voice services
than households in smaller towns and rural areas. The same is true for married households, for larger households
with a small number of kids below age 15, and for more educated households. Males and younger households
also have a higher valuation for mobile phones, but they have a lower valuation for a xed-line connection. There
are also signicant dierences in the stand-alone valuations for mobile and xed-line across dierent professional
groups.
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dominant provider of xed-line services and owns most of the xed telephony network, to which
competitors need to obtain access. Furthermore, households tend to have a lower valuation
for a mobile connection that is oered by the incumbent (rst column). This reects the fact
that most European countries have strongly promoted competition in the mobile telephony
market through the policy of granting licences to develop mobile networks. Even though the
incumbent was typically granted a mobile licence early on, the competitors altogether tend to
have greater market share than the incumbent. In three countries, Lithuania, Romania and UK,
the incumbent did not receive a mobile licence at all.
Most interestingly, we can now distinguish between two sources of complementarity: contrac-
tual complementarity from having a single contract for xed and mobile at the same operator
(as before) and the complementarity between the incumbent's xed and mobile network (third
column). First, the contractual complementarity is still estimated to be positive and highly
signicant, but it is lower than in the base model. Second, the complementarity between the
incumbent's xed-line and mobile voice services is also highly signicant. In this sense, we
can conclude that the incumbent xed-line operators have an intrinsic advantage in the mobile
market. They do not only benet from the possibility of oering bundled contracts (as the
entrants can do as well), but they also benet from additional advantages relative to entrants.
The xed-line incumbents with a dominant position in xed telephony in almost all of the EU
countries thus have the possibility to leverage this position into the mobile telephony market.
To summarize, the results from the base model and its extension establish that xed-line
connections are in decline because of signicant substitution from xed to mobile telephony.
But the decline has been slowed down because of various complementarities: bundled contracts
and incumbency advantages when xed-line incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. To
quantify the importance of these ndings, we performed several policy counterfactuals on the
impact of the introduction of mobile voice services.
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Counterfactuals: the impact of mobile on the xed-line and mobile penetrations
Table 9 shows the impact of the mobile telephony on xed-line and mobile penetration in the
EU. For the year 2012 the estimated impact is based on the rst model (base model in left part
of Table 6). For the year 2007 the estimated impact is based on the second model (extended
base model in right part of Table 6), since for this year we observe whether a household has a
voice connection from the incumbent or a competitor.
The rst row in Table 9 shows the penetration rates of xed-line, mobile and no voice
adoption, as predicted by the model under the status quo in 2007 and 2012.12 The second row
shows the impact of removing mobile voice services, implemented as a prohibitive (or \innite")
price increase for mobile voice. A comparison of both rows shows the following. In 2007 mobile
telephony reduced the xed-line penetration rate by 6% points (66.9%, versus 72.9% if mobile
telephony had not existed). In 2012 the impact was even stronger: mobile telephony reduced
xed-line penetration by 14% points (63.2%, versus 77.2% without mobile telephony). These
numbers are consistent with our earlier reported xed-to-mobile diversion ratios.13 While mobile
telephony was detrimental for the xed-line network, it also implied a much larger number of
households with voice access. For example, only 2.4% of the households have no telephony in
2012, and this would have been 22.8% if there had not been mobile telephony (mainly in poorer
regions).
The third row shows the impact of bundled contracts, implemented by assuming households
have no advantage from bundling mobile and xed-line services in a single contract (as we
estimated in Table 6). In 2007 contractual bundling increased the xed-line network by 0.5%
points in 2007 (from 66.4% to 66.9%). In 2012, the impact of bundling increased to a positive
1.3% (from 61.9% to 63.2%), because of the increasing use of bundling practices.
Finally, the fourth row shows the impact of the incumbent's advantage when it oers both
12The predicted penetration rates are very close to the actual penetration rate, indicating a good model t.
13The xed-to-mobile diversion ratio is 7.7% in 2007 (=0.729-0.669)/0.78, and 15.6% in 2012 (=0.772-0.632)/0.9.
They are of same order of magnitude as reported above, but they are not entirely comparable, because we now
consider a prohibitive price increase, the total eect (rather than the average), and for 2007 a dierent specication.
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xed and mobile telephony, as has been allowed by regulators in most European countries
except the UK, Romania and Lithuania. The possibility for the incumbent xed operators to
oer mobile had a positive impact on xed-line penetration of 1.8% point (from 65.1% to 66.9%).
Furthermore, it also increases mobile penetration by 1% point (from 77.0% to 78.0%). We also
considered the impact of allowing the xed incumbents to oer mobile on their market shares.
The xed incumbent obtains an additional 2.5% market share in xed telephony when regulators
allow it to also oer mobile (57.5%-55.0%). And it obtains an additional 4.8% market share in
mobile telephony (38.1%-33.3%), as compared to a mobile entrant that would not operate a
xed network. In sum, the xed-line operators thus benet from two incumbency advantages
when allowed to oer mobile: they protect their xed-line market share, and can also leverage
it in mobile telephony. Furthermore, these incumbency advantages do not hurt, but actually
promoted total xed and mobile penetration.
5.2 Voice services and internet technology
Table 7 shows the empirical results for the third model, which considers the simultaneous choice
of voice and internet technology. As discussed in Section 4, there are now 19 choice alternatives:
the 4 voice bundles f0; F;M;F +Mg, which may be combined with at most 6 possible internet
choices (including no internet). In addition to the stand-alone utilities for voice (F and M ) and
substitution/complementarity eects between xed and mobile (), we now also estimate how
household characteristics inuence internet adoption (I), and the substitution/complementary
between xed and mobile voice and the various internet technologies (j;k). The estimates for the
stand-alone utilities and substitution eects for voice services (F , M and ) are comparable
to our base model: mobile and xed-line voice services are perceived as substitutes, and this is
more so in the CEE countries than in the WE countries.
Our new ndings relate to the substitution/complementarity eects between voice services
and internet (j;k). Based on Table 7, this can be summarized as follows. On the one hand,
all ve broadband technologies are complementary with a mobile voice connection, but the
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complementarity is strongest for the mobile broadband technology. On the other hand, DSL
and dial-up are the only broadband technologies that show a strong complementarity with a
xed-line connection. Cable and other broadband show only very weak or no complementarity
with a xed-line connection, whereas mobile broadband is in fact a strong substitute for a xed
line connection. This follows from the fact that DSL and dial-up require households to have
a copper line connection, so that they can obtain xed-line voice services at small or no costs.
In contrast, mobile broadband does not require a copper line connection, so that they become
substitutes.
It is also interesting to note the complementarity that is generated from bundled contracts.
As already found in the base model, a contract that bundles xed and mobile voice generates
complementarities (in the form of price discounts or convenience). Furthermore, there is an even
stronger complementarity from contracts that bundle xed voice with broadband internet (dial-
up or DSL). There is also some complementarity from bundling mobile voice with internet, but
this is weaker, which may be because mobile internet has not yet been up to speed during our
sample period.
Note that our model also included interactions of household characteristics with internet
access (I). These results are shown in the Appendix, and we briey review them here. First,
households living in the cities and smaller towns are more likely to use internet, as compared
to households from rural areas. Males and married households are more likely to have internet
access. The same is true for larger households, households with many kids, younger and highly
educated households.
To summarize, the results from the third model conrm the presence of signicant substi-
tution from xed to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we nd that the decline of xed telephony
has been slowed down because of the complementarity of the xed network with dierent broad-
band technologies and the associated bundled contracts. As in the previous subsection, we now
quantify the importance of these ndings through several policy counterfactuals. We focus only
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on the impact of the introduction of internet.14
Counterfactuals: the impact of internet on the xed-line and mobile penetrations
Table 10 shows the impact of internet on xed-line and mobile voice penetration in the EU. This
is based on our third model `base model + broadband' (for which the parameter estimates were
reported in Table 7). The rst row shows the predicted penetration rates under the status quo.
These are close to the numbers in Table 9.
The second row shows the estimated impact of entirely removing internet. A comparison of
the rst and second row shows the following. Without the introduction of internet, xed-line
voice penetration would have been 7% points lower in 2007 (69.1% { 62.1%), and even 9.9%
points lower in 2012 (63.7% { 53.8%). The complementarity with internet has thus been a main
driver for slowing down the process of xed-to-mobile substitution.
The third row of Table 10 shows how much of the broadband internet eect can be attributed
to DSL, which is the main broadband technology in the EU requiring copper xed-line connec-
tion.15 Without the DSL internet technology, xed-line voice penetration would have been 6.3%
points lower in 2007, and 8.8% points lower in 2012. Hence, most of the positive impact of
internet on the xed line network can be attributed to the complementarity with DSL.
Finally, the fourth row shows the impact of the contractual bundling practices on the xed
and mobile telephony networks. If xed-line and internet were not oered as bundles, then
xed-line penetration would be up to 10% lower. Hence, the positive eect of internet on the
xed line network can be entirely attributed to the bundling practices. This can be in the form
of price discounts or convenience from having a single provider for voice and internet.
The discussion so far focused on the large positive impact of internet on the xed-line net-
work. The impact of internet on the mobile network has also been positive but not surprisingly
much smaller in magnitude. For example, without internet, mobile voice penetration would have
14The counterfactuals for the impact of mobile voice on xed and mobile voice give similar results as in the two
models in the previous section, so we do not report these here.
15Dial-up internet (or narrowband) also requires the copper xed-line network, but it is quickly losing popularity.
In our counterfactual we remove both DSL and dial-up.
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been 3.2% points lower (78.8% { 75.6%).
Tables 9 and 10 report predictions for the EU countries altogether, but there are signicant
dierences across countries in how xed-line penetration changes in these dierent scenarios.
This is due to dierences in substitution between xed-line and mobile services and dierences
in penetration of internet technologies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a rich survey data on 160,363 households from 27 EU countries in the years
2005-2012 to analyze substitution between access to xed-line and mobile telecommunications
services, and the role of complementarities that may inuence this process. We estimate discrete
choice models in which households can choose between access to xed-line and/or mobile voice
services, possibly in combination with broadband.
We consider three model specications. In the rst model specication, households only
choose between voice services where the choice set consists of 4 alternatives: no telephone,
xed, mobile or both. In the second specication, households choose between voice services
from the xed-line incumbent operator or from competitors, so that the choice set is extended
to 9 alternatives. In the third model specication, households simultaneously choose voice and
internet technology. There are 19 choice alternatives in this case: the 4 choices of voice from the
rst specication, which may be combined with at most 6 internet technology choices (including
having no internet).
The results from the rst and second model specication show that xed-line connections
are in decline because of signicant substitution from xed to mobile telephony: in 2012 mobile
telephony reduced xed-line penetration by 14% points. The degree of substitution is not homo-
geneous: it varies between households and it is stronger in regions with a high income per capita
and in the CEE countries (which may be due to the lower quality of the xed network than
in the WE countries). We also nd that the decline has been slowed down because of various
complementarities: bundled contracts and especially incumbency advantages when xed-line
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incumbents are also active in mobile telephony. These incumbency advantages increased the
incumbent's market share by about 2.5% points in xed telephony, and by up to 5% points in
mobile telephony. Incumbents could thus not only slow down the xed-to-mobile substitution
process, but also leverage their strong position in xed telephony into the mobile telephony
market. These complementarities did not hurt, but actually benetted total xed and mobile
penetration.
The results from the third model conrm the presence of signicant substitution from xed
to mobile telephony. Furthermore, we nd that the decline of xed telephony has been slowed
down because of the complementarity of the xed network with Internet. In particular, without
the introduction of DSL, xed-line voice penetration would have been almost 9% points lower
in 2012. Most of these complementarities arise from the fact that xed-line and broadband
are oered in a bundled contract (enabling price discounts and increased convenience). These
ndings show that the xed-line incumbent operator has not only been able to leverage its
advantage to mobile voice services, but more importantly also to broadband, since the incumbent
typically owns the xed copper network infrastructure.
Our results suggest that policies towards regulation of broadband market have an impact
on the market structure of voice services. We can in general distinguish between two regulatory
approaches which result in dierent market structures of broadband services. One approach
is to promote competition on the incumbent's copper network through regulation which pro-
vides entrants with access to incumbent's infrastructure via local loop unbundling (service-based
competition).16 Another approach is to promote deployment and competition between dierent
broadband platforms such as cable modem, bre, WiFi and more recently mobile broadband
(infrastructure-based competition). Some countries opted for service-based competition resulting
in high market share of DSL connections, while other pursued infrastructure-based competition
with a high market share of other broadband technologies. In future work, it would be interest-
ing to perform policy counterfactuals to our model to evaluate the impact of these alternative
16Local loop unbundling is the regulatory process of allowing multiple telecommunications operators to use
connections from the telephone exchange to the customer's premises.
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policies on voice and broadband adoption.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Shares of voice technologies across the EU countries
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std Min Max
Cost of mobile 160,363 10.6 4.9 1.18 29.7
Cost of xed-line 160,363 36.9 7.9 16.3 57.4
GDP per capita 160,363 22.6 16 2.7 250
Male 160,363 0.45 0.5 0 1
Married 160,363 0.52 0.5 0 1
Age <= 24 160,363 0.12 0.3 0 1
Age > 24 and <= 34 160,363 0.15 0.4 0 1
Age > 34 and <= 44 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 44 and <= 54 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 54 and <= 64 160,363 0.17 0.4 0 1
Age > 64 (base) 160,363 0.22 0.4 0 1
Household size 160,363 2.51 1.1 1 4
Number of kids 160,237 0.16 0.4 0 4
Education years <= 15 160,363 0.2 0.4 0 1
Education years > 15 and < 20 160,363 0.43 0.5 0 1
Education years 20+ 160,363 0.27 0.4 0 1
Living in rural area (base) 160,363 0.36 0.5 0 1
Living in town 160,363 0.28 0.4 0 1
Living in city 160,363 0.37 0.5 0 1
Profession: unemployed (base) 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: housekeeping 160,363 0.07 0.3 0 1
Profession: student 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: retired 160,363 0.29 0.5 0 1
Profession: oce employee 160,363 0.08 0.3 0 1
Profession: professional 160,363 0.04 0.2 0 1
Profession: manual worker 160,363 0.14 0.3 0 1
Profession: proprietor 160,363 0.04 0.2 0 1
Profession: manager 160,363 0.07 0.3 0 1
Profession: farmer 160,363 0.01 0.1 0 1
Profession: travelling 160,363 0.1 0.3 0 1
Internet access: DSL 160,363 0.26 0.4 0 1
Internet access: cable 160,363 0.12 0.3 0 1
Internet access: dial-up 160,363 0.09 0.3 0 1
Internet access: mobile 160,363 0.03 0.2 0 1
Internet access: other 160,363 0.03 0.2 0 1
Base variable is indicated for dummy variables. In the case of Education years dummies, the reference are
households without education or with missing information.
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Table 2: Choice of voice technologies
Fixed-line
No Yes Total
Mobile No 5,775 19,567 25,342
Yes 46,471 88,550 135,021
Total 52,246 108,117 160,363
Table 3: Choice of voice technologies oered by incumbent and competitor
Fixed-line
None Incumbent Competitor Total
Mobile None 3,297 8,459 835 12,591
Incumbent 4,091 10,227 1,423 15,741
Competitor 8,993 12,995 3,086 25,074
Total 16,381 31,681 5,344 53,406
Table 4: Choice of voice and broadband technologies
DSL Dial-up Cable modem Mobile Other None Total
Mobile only 6,210 1,155 7,183 3,019 3,008 26,710 47,285
Fixed-line only 1,325 774 497 50 129 16,861 19,636
Mobile+ Fixed-line 33,470 12,253 11,447 2,259 2,656 29,133 91,218
None 79 26 88 15 29 5,544 5,781
Total 41,084 14,208 19,215 5,343 5,822 78,248 163,920
The total number 163,920 is greater than the number of observations 160,363 because of multi-homing of broad-
band technologies.
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Table 5: Multihoming of broadband technologies
DSL Dial-up Cable modem Mobile Other None Total
DSL 0 740 307 1,091 134 38,812 41,084
Dial-up 98 141 179 59 12,893 13,370
Cable modem 0 447 80 18,240 18,767
Mobile 0 95 3,531 3,626
Other 186 5,082 5,268
None 78,248 78,248
160,363
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Table 6: Choice model for voice services
Base model Base model + Incumbent
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed ()
Price -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intercept -0.643*** 2.910*** -0.654*** -1.426*** 0.719*** -0.225
(0.103) (0.104) (0.114) (0.148) (0.141) (0.166)
CEE dummy 0.164*** -0.620*** -0.411*** -0.168** -1.091*** 0.236***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.038) (0.078) (0.078) (0.088)
GDP per capita 1.303*** 1.104*** -0.710*** 0.954*** 0.408*** -0.134**
(0.027) (0.029) (0.031) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057)
Bundle Mobile+Fixed 2.144*** 1.437***
(0.048) (0.072)
Incumbent -0.516*** 1.334*** 0.397***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021)
Year dummy: 2007 0.051 -0.408*** 0.075 0.104** -0.274*** -0.005
(0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048)
Year dummy: 2008 0.215*** -0.590*** 0.160***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.053)
Year dummy: 2009 1.041*** -0.168*** -0.373***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.058)
Year dummy: 2011 1.252*** -0.350*** -0.234***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.062)
Year dummy: 2012 1.274*** -0.380*** -0.282***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.061)
Observations 640,948 405,902
Households 160,363 53,199
Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE
countries. The regressions include household characteristics which are reported in Table 8. Base model +
incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor. The regression includes household
characteristics which are reported in Table A.5.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 7: Choice model for voice services and broadband internet
Base model + Broadband
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile Broadband Broadband Broadband
+Fixed () +Mobile (M ) +Fixed (F )
Price -0.039*** -0.039***
(0.001) (0.001)
Intercept -0.695*** 3.069*** -0.437***
(0.104) (0.105) (0.115)
CEE dummy 0.137*** -0.637*** -0.403***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.039)
GDP per capita 1.205*** 0.961*** -0.809*** 0.823***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.010)
Dial-up connection -7.946*** 1.025*** 2.471***
(0.078) (0.041) (0.035)
DSL connection -6.709*** 1.509*** 1.789***
(0.068) (0.032) (0.019)
Cable connection -6.450*** 1.412*** 0.552***
(0.078) (0.049) (0.020)
Mobile broadband -7.835*** 1.786*** -0.833***
(0.196) (0.186) (0.040)
Other broadband -7.681*** 1.343*** 0.042
(0.129) (0.113) (0.035)
Bundle Mobile + Fixed 1.645***
(0.059)
Bundle Mobile + Internet 0.543***
(0.102)
Bundle Fixed + Internet 3.564***
(0.051)
Year dummy: 2007 0.024 0.140*** 0.071 -0.430***
(0.051) (0.022) (0.046) (0.047)
Year dummy: 2008 0.010 0.514*** 0.235*** -0.686***
(0.053) (0.022) (0.048) (0.049)
Year dummy: 2009 -0.684*** 1.103*** 1.052*** -0.421***
(0.059) (0.023) (0.054) (0.055)
Year dummy: 2010 -0.606*** 1.478*** 1.221*** -0.719***
(0.063) (0.023) (0.057) (0.059)
Year dummy: 2011 -0.303*** 1.475*** 1.053*** -0.518***
(0.061) (0.023) (0.055) (0.058)
Observations 2,982,316
Households 160,363
Base model + Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections. The regression include household
characteristics which are reported in Table A.5.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 8: Choice model for voice services: household characteristics eects
Base model
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed ()
Living in city 0.757*** 0.635*** -0.499***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.047)
Living in town 0.519*** 0.258*** -0.337***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038)
Male -0.373*** -0.570*** 0.540***
(0.032) (0.034) (0.036)
Married 0.411*** 0.341*** -0.175***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Household size 0.126*** 0.304*** 0.097***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Number of kids -0.132*** -0.283*** 0.157***
(0.044) (0.051) (0.053)
Age > 24 and  34 1.966*** -2.270*** 0.476***
(0.093) (0.121) (0.125)
Age > 34 and  44 2.013*** -2.066*** 0.172*
(0.078) (0.091) (0.095)
Age > 44 and  54 1.550*** -1.539*** 0.048
(0.073) (0.080) (0.085)
Age > 54 and  64 1.091*** -1.050*** 0.022
(0.062) (0.064) (0.070)
Age > 64 0.907*** -0.482*** -0.047
(0.047) (0.046) (0.052)
Education years 15- 0.353*** 0.315*** -0.056
(0.071) (0.069) (0.082)
Education years > 15 and  20 1.102*** 0.762*** -0.133
(0.071) (0.071) (0.082)
Education years 20+ 1.686*** 1.270*** -0.342***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.096)
Profession: housekeeping -0.072 -0.561*** 0.260***
(0.071) (0.081) (0.086)
Profession: student 2.086*** 1.274*** -0.180
(0.136) (0.167) (0.175)
Profession: retired 0.177*** 0.044 -0.016
(0.065) (0.065) (0.071)
Profession: oce employee 1.401*** 0.606*** -0.372***
(0.124) (0.134) (0.136)
Profession: professional 1.159*** 0.197 0.223
(0.161) (0.178) (0.182)
Profession: manual worker 0.770*** 0.113 -0.299***
(0.071) (0.077) (0.081)
Profession: proprietor 1.828*** 1.101*** -0.733***
(0.175) (0.185) (0.187)
Profession: manager 1.264*** 0.692*** -0.405***
(0.143) (0.151) (0.154)
Profession: farmer -0.090 0.326*** 0.034
(0.113) (0.118) (0.131)
Profession: travelling 1.382*** 0.621*** -0.592***
(0.105) (0.113) (0.116)
Observations 640,948
Households 160,363
Base model: choices of voice connections with substitution parameters for two groups of CEE and WE countries.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 9: The impact of mobile on xed-line and mobile penetrations: predicted penetrations in
2007 and 2012
2007 2012
mobile xed-line none mobile xed-line none
Current 78.0% 66.9% 6.1% 90.0% 63.2% 2.4%
of which incumbent 38.1% 57.5%
No mobile 0.0% 72.9% 27.1% 0.0% 77.2% 22.8%
of which incumbent 0.0% 61.6%
No xed-mobile bundle 77.7% 66.4% 6.2% 89.7% 61.9% 2.4%
of which incumbent 38.1% 57.0%
No incumbent's xed-mobile advantage 77.0% 65.1% 6.3% n.a. n.a. n.a.
of which incumbent 33.3% 55.0%
Predicted mobile and xed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No mobiles: no mobile
telephones available; (iii) No mobile+xed bundle: zero value of mobile+xed bundle; (iv) No incumbent's
xed-mobile advantage: no additional utility from using mobile and xed-line from incumbent.
Table 10: The impact of broadband on xed-line: predicted mobile and xed-line penetration
in 2007 and 2012
2007 2012
mobile xed-line none mobile xed-line none
Current 78.8% 69.1% 4.9% 90.1% 63.7% 2.4%
No broadband 75.6% 62.1% 5.8% 86.6% 53.8% 3.4%
No DSL 77.3% 62.8% 5.3% 88.8% 54.9% 2.9%
No bundle xed+internet 78.9% 66.6% 5.0% 90.4% 53.7% 2.6%
Predicted mobile and xed-line penetration for: (i) Current: current situation; (ii) No broadband: no broadband
available (iii) No DSL: no DSL broadband available; (iv) No bundle xed+internet: zero value of xed+internet
bundle.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Sample size by country
2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012 Sum
Austria 1,019 1,029 1,012 1,001 1,030 1,047 6,138
Belgium 1,011 1,009 1,004 1,003 1,025 1,033 6,085
Bulgaria 1,002 1,023 1,000 1,007 1,001 1,001 6,034
Cyprus 507 504 505 502 500 503 3,021
Czech Republic 1,012 1150 1169 1,096 1,014 995 6,436
Germany 1,515 1,504 1,519 1,522 1,622 1,562 9,244
Denmark 1,039 1,037 1,000 1,008 1,013 1,011 6,108
Estonia 1,000 1,000 1,002 1,000 1,003 1,000 6,005
Greece 999 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 999 5,998
Spain 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,023 1,004 1,010 6,037
Finland 1,023 1,028 1,038 1,041 1,001 1,002 6,133
France 1,031 1,012 1,024 1,005 1,035 1,051 6,158
Hungary 1,010 1,000 1,000 1,017 1,029 1,012 6,068
Ireland 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,014 1,007 1,014 6,035
Italy 1,011 1,038 1,039 1,039 1,027 1,011 6,165
Lithuania 1,022 1,025 1,018 1,027 1,029 1,025 6,146
Luxembourg 500 502 500 502 503 507 3,014
Latvia 1,046 1,019 1,009 1,004 1,014 1,021 6,113
Malta 500 500 500 500 500 500 3,000
Netherlands 1127 1,020 1,000 1,004 1,012 1,008 6,171
Poland 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 6,000
Portugal 1,004 1,004 1,000 1,038 1,010 1,005 6,061
Romania 1,003 1,000 1,000 1,008 1,053 1,034 6,098
Sweden 1,009 1,014 1,015 1,014 1,024 1,023 6,099
Slovenia 1,028 1,019 1,016 1,017 1,018 1,014 6,112
Slovakia 1,015 1,003 1,055 1,047 1,040 999 6,159
United Kingdom 1,310 1,315 1,305 1,322 1,322 1,306 7,880
Sum 26,743 26,755 26,730 26,761 26,836 26,693 160,518
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Table A.2: Households with xed-line access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012
Austria 0.69 0.58 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.47
Belgium 0.77 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.70 0.71
Bulgaria 0.68 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.51 0.53
Cyprus 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.85 0.77
Czech Republic 0.54 0.44 0.35 0.24 0.17 0.19
Germany 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.88 0.88
Denmark 0.86 0.84 0.80 0.73 0.68 0.66
Estonia 0.63 0.52 0.60 0.54 0.51 0.52
Greece 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.84 0.83
Spain 0.77 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.71
Finland 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.33 0.26 0.24
France 0.86 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.90
Hungary 0.68 0.48 0.45 0.54 0.49 0.49
Ireland 0.83 0.76 0.82 0.73 0.69 0.69
Italy 0.68 0.53 0.58 0.69 0.66 0.69
Lithuania 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.35
Luxembourg 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.91
Latvia 0.56 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.39
Malta 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.96
Netherlands 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.88
Poland 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.55 0.49 0.46
Portugal 0.56 0.63 0.43 0.54 0.61 0.62
Romania 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.45
Sweden 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99
Slovenia 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.78
Slovakia 0.59 0.53 0.49 0.41 0.38 0.32
United Kingdom 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.86
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Table A.3: Households with mobile access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012
Austria 0.80 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.93
Belgium 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.89
Bulgaria 0.47 0.53 0.62 0.77 0.82 0.78
Cyprus 0.76 0.72 0.83 0.90 0.93 0.96
Czech Republic 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96
Germany 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.85 0.87
Denmark 0.85 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.95
Estonia 0.75 0.82 0.85 0.90 0.93 0.92
Greece 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.90 0.91
Spain 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.87 0.87
Finland 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.95
France 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.88
Hungary 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.80 0.86 0.85
Ireland 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.94
Italy 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.94
Lithuania 0.70 0.77 0.82 0.90 0.93 0.93
Luxembourg 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.95
Latvia 0.72 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.95
Malta 0.73 0.80 0.79 0.85 0.89 0.82
Netherlands 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.94
Poland 0.59 0.65 0.72 0.78 0.84 0.82
Portugal 0.64 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.85
Romania 0.50 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.85 0.81
Sweden 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.94
Slovenia 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.92
Slovakia 0.73 0.80 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.92
United Kingdom 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.88
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Table A.4: Households with xed-line and mobile access by country (%)
Country 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 2012
Austria 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.41 0.40
Belgium 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.62 0.62
Bulgaria 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.39
Cyprus 0.68 0.60 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.73
Czech Republic 0.45 0.37 0.31 0.21 0.16 0.18
Germany 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.76
Denmark 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.65 0.63 0.61
Estonia 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.46
Greece 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.74 0.74
Spain 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.60
Finland 0.49 0.43 0.37 0.28 0.23 0.19
France 0.62 0.58 0.64 0.73 0.74 0.78
Hungary 0.43 0.30 0.31 0.39 0.41 0.40
Ireland 0.67 0.65 0.72 0.66 0.64 0.64
Italy 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.65 0.61 0.65
Lithuania 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.31 0.30
Luxembourg 0.82 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.88 0.86
Latvia 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.37
Malta 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.79
Netherlands 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.83
Poland 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.34
Portugal 0.33 0.46 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.51
Romania 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36
Sweden 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.92
Slovenia 0.75 0.70 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.70
Slovakia 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.27
United Kingdom 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.68 0.78 0.75
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Table A.5: Estimates of household characteristics
Base model + Incumbent Base model + Broadband
Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Mobile Fixed-line Mobile+Fixed () Broadband
Living in city 0.749*** 0.549*** -0.479*** 0.749*** 0.603*** -0.543*** 0.243***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.065) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.017)
Living in town 0.495*** 0.252*** -0.334*** 0.517*** 0.219*** -0.378*** 0.185***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.055) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.015)
Male -0.160*** -0.410*** 0.457*** -0.386*** -0.590*** 0.498*** 0.235***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.014)
Married 0.328*** 0.258*** -0.049 0.406*** 0.336*** -0.197*** 0.179***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.016)
Household size 0.072** 0.346*** 0.082** 0.087*** 0.243*** 0.068*** 0.296***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.033) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.008)
Number of kids -0.127** -0.269*** 0.129* -0.145*** -0.296*** 0.159*** 0.031*
(0.060) (0.066) (0.070) (0.044) (0.052) (0.053) (0.016)
Age > 24 and  34 2.652*** -2.043*** 0.210 1.877*** -2.485*** 0.228* 1.326***
(0.137) (0.170) (0.181) (0.094) (0.121) (0.126) (0.039)
Age > 34 and  44 2.490*** -1.729*** -0.031 1.933*** -2.291*** -0.068 1.271***
(0.111) (0.123) (0.135) (0.078) (0.092) (0.096) (0.032)
Age > 44 and  54 1.868*** -1.264*** -0.086 1.472*** -1.749*** -0.179** 1.244***
(0.105) (0.108) (0.121) (0.073) (0.080) (0.085) (0.031)
Age > 54 and  64 1.407*** -0.732*** -0.195* 1.053*** -1.193*** -0.212*** 1.133***
(0.089) (0.087) (0.102) (0.062) (0.064) (0.070) (0.029)
Age > 64 1.025*** -0.326*** -0.059 0.894*** -0.564*** -0.203*** 0.787***
(0.069) (0.062) (0.078) (0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (0.024)
Education years 15- 0.663*** 0.507*** -0.425*** 0.386*** 0.332*** 0.006 -0.489***
(0.110) (0.095) (0.128) (0.072) (0.069) (0.083) (0.048)
Education years > 15 and  20 1.333*** 0.988*** -0.524*** 1.091*** 0.685*** -0.202** 0.326***
(0.110) (0.098) (0.129) (0.072) (0.071) (0.083) (0.046)
Education years 20+ 1.634*** 1.377*** -0.546*** 1.531*** 1.022*** -0.441*** 1.038***
(0.124) (0.113) (0.142) (0.086) (0.086) (0.097) (0.047)
Profession: housekeeping -0.073 -0.488*** 0.076 -0.072 -0.578*** 0.258*** -0.032
(0.102) (0.110) (0.123) (0.071) (0.081) (0.086) (0.033)
Prefession: student 1.802*** 1.338*** -0.362 1.687*** 0.781*** -0.174 1.491***
(0.189) (0.222) (0.243) (0.137) (0.169) (0.176) (0.059)
Profession: retired 0.212** 0.052 -0.148 0.161** 0.018 -0.006 0.050*
(0.092) (0.086) (0.101) (0.065) (0.065) (0.071) (0.030)
Profession: oce employee 1.225*** 0.607*** -0.253 1.227*** 0.387*** -0.370*** 0.616***
(0.163) (0.174) (0.181) (0.125) (0.135) (0.138) (0.032)
Profession: professional 1.199*** 0.257 0.174 0.847*** -0.193 0.270 1.027***
(0.210) (0.230) (0.238) (0.163) (0.180) (0.183) (0.043)
Profession: manual worker 0.619*** 0.035 -0.260** 0.744*** 0.067 -0.304*** 0.121***
(0.097) (0.102) (0.111) (0.071) (0.077) (0.081) (0.029)
Profession: proprietor 1.387*** 0.898*** -0.493** 1.664*** 0.906*** -0.742*** 0.617***
(0.209) (0.219) (0.227) (0.176) (0.185) (0.188) (0.038)
Profession: manager 1.035*** 0.490*** -0.105 0.894*** 0.279* -0.292* 0.982***
(0.177) (0.187) (0.195) (0.145) (0.153) (0.155) (0.036)
Profession: farmer -0.395** 0.196 0.164 -0.072 0.393*** 0.110 -0.360***
(0.173) (0.161) (0.199) (0.113) (0.118) (0.131) (0.062)
Profession: travelling 1.167*** 0.550*** -0.470*** 1.242*** 0.453*** -0.597*** 0.521***
(0.139) (0.147) (0.154) (0.106) (0.114) (0.116) (0.030)
Observations 405,902 2,982,316
Households 53,199 160,363
(i) Base model + Incumbent: choices of voice connections from incumbent vs. competitor; (ii) Base model +
Broadband: choices of voice and broadband connections.
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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